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Getting It Right:
What the United States Can Do To Prevent
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
in the Twenty-First Century
John Norris*
[Rwanda] sits as the greatest regret that I have from the time I was U.N. am-
bassador and maybe even as [S]ecretary of [S]tate, because it is a huge tragedy,
and something that sits very heavy on all our souls, I think.
- Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, February 25, 2004'
You look at something like Darfur, and it just breaks your heart.
- Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, September 20, 20082
[O]ne of the real regrets I've had is that we haven't been able to do something
about Sudan.
- Former U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, November 13, 2oo8l
INTRODUCTION
It has become a dispiritingly sad and almost pro forma ritual: The outgoing
U.S. Secretary of State expresses his or her regrets about failing to do enough to
stop genocide and war crimes in remote regions of the world. The regrets are
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1. Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda (PBS television broadcast Feb. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/themes/legacy.html.
2. The Next President: A World of Challenges (CNN television broadcast Sept. 20,
2008), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/o8o9/2o/se.ol.html.
3. Meet the Press with David Gregory (NBC television broadcast Dec. 21, 20o8), avail-
able at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28337897.
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sincere; I have no doubt. Yet, given the very predictability of this pattern, some
hard questions should be asked. Three, or perhaps seven, years from now, will
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton take a hushed moment in her exit interview
with a media luminary of the day to express her qualms that more was not done
to stop widespread killings in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Soma-
lia, Chechnya, or Iraq? Why is it that Democratic and Republican administra-
tions seem to struggle equally, albeit in different ways, with these foreign policy
quandaries? Is the problem ultimately an institutional one, or is it more a ques-
tion of leadership?
There are high expectations that the Obama Administration will break this
wearying trend of inaction in the face of catastrophe. As a United States Sena-
tor, President Obama spoke passionately and eloquently about genocide and
crimes against humanity.4 He was a long-time advocate of a more forceful ap-
proach to dealing with Darfur, although his policy statements were carefully
nuanced in that regard.' President Obama's key foreign policy advisers are well-
known humanitarian hawks who view the fight against genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity not only as a moral imperative, but also as a key
pillar of national security. Samantha Power, who has long had Obama's ear on
the topic and is now serving at the National Security Council, won a Pulitzer
Prize for her passionate writing on the difficulties the U.S. foreign policy estab-
lishment has faced in grappling with genocide, what she termed the "problem
from hell." 6 Most of the profiles that appeared when Susan Rice was offered the
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) post noted her long history of
calling for robust action against genocide.7 Members of Obama's team have
embraced the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect." They have made careers
4. A good example can be found in a taped interview then-Senator Obama con-
ducted on February 15, 2006, in response to queries on Darfur from an advocacy
organization. In this interview, Senator Obama noted, "Darfur is an important
test case. We've already failed one test in Rwanda, we shouldn't fail another."
Podcast: Senator Barack Obama, Darfur: Current Policy Not Enough Security
(Feb. 15, 20o6), http://obamaspeeches.com/052-Darfur-Current-Policy-Not
-Enough-Obama-Speech.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009); see also JOHN NORRIS ET
AL., MCCAIN AND OBAMA SPEAK OUT ON DARFUR AND MORE-SUMMARY
(2oo8), available at http://www.enoughactionfund.org/files/ObamaMcCain
_questionnaire.pdf.
5- Obama called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur numerous times
during the campaign, including on October 7, 2008, during the second Presiden-
tial Debate held at Belmont University in Nashville, Tennessee. The Second
McCain-Obama Presidential Debate (NBC television broadcast Oct. 7, 20o8),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27o73997/pageh2.
6. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002).
7. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Choice for U.N. Backs Actions Against Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2008, at A12; Michael A. Fletcher & Colum Lynch, Shift on U.N. Seen in
Rice Nomination, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2008, at An.
27:417 2009
GETTING IT RIGHT
arguing for the necessity of intervention, including the use of military force, in
cases where mass violence is perpetrated against civilian populations, and sov-
ereign governments are unwilling or unable to stop the killing.'
In December 2008, the bipartisan Genocide Prevention Task Force-
co-chaired by Madeleine Albright and former Defense Secretary William
Cohen-issued its findings on preventing genocide and major crimes against
humanity.9 The report-a commendable effort, well-timed for the new admini-
stration, and long in the making-gets it right on many of the big picture issues.
The document concludes that genocide is ultimately preventable and rejects the
historical determinism of "ancient ethnic hatreds" and other convenient ex-
cuses for inaction. The Task Force argues that genocide prevention is in the na-
tional interest and accordingly urges the president to make such efforts a na-
tional priority.'" The report emphasizes the need for increased prevention
funding and sharper inter-agency cooperation and communication in the early
stages of violence." The United States will never be effective in stopping mass
killings until the president is willing to level with the American public about
what is happening and what can be done to change course.
Perhaps most importantly, the report observes that little progress is possi-
ble without genuine leadership at the highest levels." Frequently, the need for
better organization is overemphasized as the way to prevent genocide. Better
early warning systems, more effective coordination meetings, a task force
charged solely with investigating war crimes, a new deputy at the National Secu-
rity Council in charge of prevention, and a hundred other eminently sensible
suggestions have been proposed but ultimately remain insufficient. Everyone
would welcome better intelligence and forecasting, but the idea that superior
indicators or more efficient inter-agency meetings will fix the problem is an un-
helpful myth.
Think of those places that have suffered catastrophic civilian killings over
the last two decades: Bosnia, Burma, Darfur, eastern DRC, East Timor, Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. Did any of these situations truly
catch policymakers unawares? The world was shocked by the speed and scope of
the killings in Rwanda. In the months prior to the genocide, however, senior
UN officials knew, and reported to headquarters, that large-scale massacres
were in the advanced planning stages; indications included the large shipments
8. See Preventing Genocide, THE EcONoMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 43.
9. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM COHEN, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/genocide
_taskforce/report.html.
10. Id. at xv, 6.
n1. Id. at 17-51.
12. Id. at 1-13.
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of machetes arriving in Kigali. 3 These reports were deliberately downplayed in
both New York and Washington.'4 In Bosnia, a failed UN peacekeeping force
actually helped separate the adult male population from other civilians before
the men were massacred at Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces and dumped into
mass graves. 5 Aerial photographs of the mass graves quickly became available at
NATO headquarters. In Darfur, the killings and systematic efforts to drain the
region of much of its civilian population have persisted for five years without
even a hint of an effective response from the international community. The
Bush Administration welcomed the head of Sudan's intelligence services as a
visitor in Washington. 6 The UN continues to allow the Sudanese government
in Khartoum to wield an effective veto over the operations of the peacekeeping
force," and the Sudanese President-facing an arrest warrant from the Interna-
tional Criminal Court on war crimes charges-personally wrote to President
Bush asking if he would like to visit Sudan after his term concluded."
How is it that the United States stood with its hands in its proverbial pock-
ets as such atrocities took place? Perhaps it is more important to understand ex-
actly how successive administrations have avoided addressing genocide and war
crimes than to focus solely on the bureaucratic improvements that would make
responses more effective. There is no substitute for genuine political will cou-
pled with an educated public constituency that believes mass killings are unac-
ceptable. To understand how the Obama Administration might deal with these
fundamental challenges, it is important to step back and recognize the behav-
iors and tactics that other administrations have used to evade hard choices.
I. A PRIMER ON How To GET IT WRONG
Through hard experience, we now possess a virtual textbook on the many
strategies our senior leaders have used to delay, derail, and postpone preventing
war crimes around the globe. Although by no means exhaustive, the following
responses represent some of the classic dodges employed.
13. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 103-05 (1998).
14. For an excellent collection of declassified documents at the National Security
Archives, see THE US AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 1994: EVIDENCE OF INAC-
TION (William Ferroggiaro ed., 2001), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.html.
15. See JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR
CRIME 33-45 (1996).
16. See Ken Silverstein, Sudanese Visitor Splits U.S. Officials, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005,
at Al.
17. Editorial, The UN Blinks on Darfur, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2007, at 8.
18. Letter from Omar Hassan Ahmed AI-Bashir, President of Sudan, to George W.





A. "It's Very Complicated"
Claiming complications is a perennial favorite of Department of State
spokespersons and presidents hoping to avoid taking action. Bosnia was de-
scribed as a cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. Claims abound that the situa-
tion in Darfur has degenerated into chaos and anarchy that make blaming any
single party for events on the ground or holding them accountable virtually im-
possible-even when it is clear that government-directed forces are doing most
of the killing. A discussion about Rwanda turns into a debate about the Belgian
colonial legacy, identity cards, ethnography, and the history of cattle ownership
rather than a focus on what should have been done to stop the killing immedi-
ately. In short, administrations frequently try to avoid dealing with genocide
and war crimes by insisting that the situation on the ground is so complex that
only career professionals could even begin to make sense of it. Moreover, such
systematic complications are used to suggest that there is no reason for the
United States to intervene or for the American public to lose sleep over these
events. Most presidents and Foreign Service officers possess a natural gift for
making international issues sound more convoluted than they really are, so this
strategy should not be surprising.
This is not to say that addressing genocide and war crimes is easy, but as-
certaining the responsible parties in mass atrocities is usually not difficult. If
thousands of people are being killed and driven from their homes, evidence of
such death and dislocation typically abounds, and a fairly bright line often can
be drawn back to the perpetrators. If satellites can read license plates from outer
space, can it be so difficult to determine which side in a conflict has perpetrated
a massive ethnic cleansing campaign or systematically wiped out the adult male
population of a rival group? In an age of unprecedentedly pervasive electronic
eavesdropping, does it really take years to discern the facts of mass killings in
Bosnia or Rwanda? If any president begins his speech from the podium by stat-
ing: "It is a very complex situation," his address most likely will close with an
equally stirring call to inaction.
B. "Maybe Weapons Would Help"
The idea that simply providing a beleaguered population with weapons to
defend itself would absolve world powers from moral approbation is a well-
worn one. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, there was considerable discussion of
keeping the United States and NATO out of the war while providing weapons
to those who were suffering wave after wave of war crimes. 9 During the 2008
presidential campaign, Senator John McCain advocated providing air defense
systems to the southern Sudanese to prevent a replay of the mass killings that
19. See Raymond Bonner, NATO Is Wary of Proposals To Help Arm Kosovo Rebels,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, at A8; Alan Riding, Kohl Urges Arming of Bosnian Mus-
lims, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at A6.
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marked Sudan's long-running north-south civil war." The idea is a tidy one:
Washington can provide weapons without having to put any of its own troops
in harm's way. This strategy worked well during the Cold War amid multiple
proxy conflicts, so why not retain the approach? Given that civilians already are
bearing the brunt of killings, pouring more ammunition on to the fire usually
does not make a great deal of sense. Further, in conflict situations like the for-
mer Yugoslavia or present-day Darfur, the state has been actively involved in
killings, and even sending numerous shipments of M15 rifles to rebels is not an
effective opposition to the government's modern air force. The inflow of weap-
ons and half-hearted foreign interventions can also be used by despotic leaders
to justify even more outrageous attacks against civilian populations accused of
collaborating with foreign powers. Thankfully, regional leaders are often in-
strumental in rejecting this perpetually recurring and ineffective policy ap-
proach. They understand that a broader and more intense conflict will usually
spill over national borders and that excess weaponry can help a war mutate and
burn even longer.
C. The "Q Word"
For presidents and secretaries of state facing a rising tide of public senti-
ment to do something, anything, about mass atrocities, the "Q word"-
quagmire-has always been an important fallback. It is not a long word, but its
eight letters powerfully and effortlessly evoke images of Vietnam and Iraq. In-
voking the potential for quagmires through foreign intervention also allows
most U.S. administrations to claim an imaginary high road: Their desire to pro-
tect the U.S. population from endless and intractable commitments overseas.
The quagmire concept plays well with left, right, and libertarian affiliates. Even
if the president does not want to utter the word directly, it is easy to find con-
gressional allies or enemies who are more than willing to do so.
The primary problem with the quagmire epithet is that it has not proven
true in most humanitarian interventions. NATO-led operations in both Bosnia
and Kosovo, although full of tension and some near-disasters, did not involve
major ground combat with U.S. forces. American troops, as part of a broader
UN-authorized coalition, did remain on the ground for a number of years after
the initial interventions, but their presence remained mostly custodial in keep-
ing formerly warring parties firmly separated. Well-designed efforts in Sierra
Leone and Liberia produced similar results.2' The tasks of reconstruction and
reconciliation are undoubtedly long-term endeavors, but what are the alterna-
20. See NORRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
21. See generally CLIFFORD BERNATH & SAYRE NYCE, REFUGEES INT'L, REPORT ON
THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (2002), available at
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:3164 (arguing that the lim-
ited UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone was a success); INT'L CRISIS
GROUP, LIBERIA: STAYING FOCUSED (20o6), available at http://www.crisisgroup




tives? Another typical option may be additional years of unfettered violence and
literally billions of dollars in taxpayer money to support humanitarian relief
that keeps people nourished but does not stop the killing.
D. False Choices
Framing issues in all-or-nothing terms is a classic gambit of military and
diplomatic officials aiming to avoid thorny issues. By cleverly describing poten-
tial U.S. involvement as the starkest possible choice between doing nothing and
invading a country with 200,000 troops to topple the sitting government, ad-
ministration officials handily place their thumb on the scale in favor of inaction.
A corollary of this strategy is to insist that the U.S. military is already over-
stretched, thereby precluding involvement in the growing crisis. Yet, the range
of alternatives to end mass killings, genocide, and war crimes are wide and var-
ied. The need for massive military intervention is almost always a last resort,
and it is usually the result of a decided failure to take other discrete steps earlier
in the process. Tougher action by the United States earlier in the conflicts in
Bosnia, Liberia, Darfur, the DRC, and elsewhere could have helped contain the
situations and sent a clear message to militia leaders and others that their abuses
would not be tolerated. It is important to remember that the most effective tool
to prevent genocide is not military force late in a process, but early, concerted
efforts at peacemaking. Scores of methods exist that can be employed before
placing boots on the ground in a hostile environment: support for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, targeted sanctions, naming and shaming, intensified ef-
forts to dry up financing of responsible parties, and enforcement of a no-fly
zone, to name a few.
Those who conduct mass killings are often shrewd and cynical students of
American politics and diplomacy. They have a tendency to read a quick yet in-
effectual response from Washington as a green light for wider abuses, and they
interpret Washington's ineffectiveness as a free ticket to impunity. It would
have been far less likely that former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevie,
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, former Liberian President Charles Taylor,
and others would have mounted such intense and murderous rampages if they
had paid a cost earlier in their careers for such depravity. As soon as Milogevi6
realized he could tie UN peacekeepers to bridges and sit comfortably untouched
in Belgrade, it was a short leap to thinking that he would pay nothing for sup-
porting militias that summarily executed large numbers of civilians.22 Bashir
perfected his divide-and-conquer tactics in the Sudan's north-south civil war; if
he had paid a cost for his earlier targeting of civilians, the situation in Darfur
may never have arisen in the first place.23 During the north-south conflict, the
22. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 94-111 (1999).
23. See generally GARETH EVANS, INT'L CRISIS GROUP, GOD, OIL AND COUNTRY:
CHANGING THE LOGIC OF WAR IN SUDAN, (2002), available at http://
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1615&1=1 (giving background on the
Sudanese civil war and discussing the government's divide and conquer strategy).
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Sudanese government often practiced a deliberate strategy of turning southern
ethnic communities against one another as a means to weaken the overall impe-
tus behind southern independence movements. This strategy included arming
local groups as proxy militias and encouraging grave human rights abuses, such
as slave raids against rival groups. This bitter counter-insurgency strategy fur-
ther opened deep ethnic fissures in the south and further unraveled Sudan's
social fabric. The Sudanese government resorted to a similar tactic in the west-
ern Sudanese region of Darfur when a rebellion broke out there, using Jan-
jaweed militias against Darfuris. One could reasonably assume that if the Suda-
nese government had encountered effective resistance from the international
community to its tactics in the north-south war, it would not have replicated
them in Darfur.
E. Regional Solutions
The U.S. government is never a greater supporter of regional institutions
than when it wishes to avoid active involvement or leadership. This is particu-
larly, but not uniquely, true in Africa. The United States has been eager to seize
on the mantra "African solutions to African problems" when steering clear of
messy situations and mass violence in Darfur, the DRC, northern Uganda, and
Zimbabwe. 4 The phrase was coined by a noted African political economist,
George Ayittey. Ayittey has argued that many of Africa's problems are self-
inflicted and stem from poor governance, winner-take-all rule, corruption, and
other factors. 5 He suggests that solutions for the continent will be more effec-
tive if Africans feel they have ownership over implementation-not that the
policies have been imposed externally.
Yet, it remains abundantly clear that few regional African institutions are
equipped to intervene effectively where mass violence against civilians occurs.
The African Union (AU) is simply an amalgam of countries bound together by
geography and little else. With little coherence, the AU lumps together dictator-
ships and democracies, free markets and closed economies, and north and
24. In 2001, while touring Africa, Secretary of State Colin Powell maintained, "Afri-
cans themselves must bear the lion's share of the responsibility for bringing stabil-
ity to the continent." Paul D. Williams, Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why "African"
Solutions Are Not Enough, 2008 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 309, 311 (quoting Ofeibea
Quist-Arcton, Powell Promises U.S. Support but Says Africa Must Help Itself,
(May 29, 2001), http://allafrica.com/stories/20010 529o190.html (last visited Mar.
11, 2009)). The recently established U.S. Africa Command has promoted its efforts
as part of a broader strategy to let "Africans deal with African problems." Id. at 311
(quoting Press Briefing, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Changes to the Unified Com-
mand Plan To Create an Africa Command (Feb. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1 54 8).
25. See GEORGE AYITTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED (1992). Ayittey coined the phrase "Afri-
can Solutions" in an October 7, 1993 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. George Ayit-
tey, An African Solution for Somalia, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1993, at A18. However, the
concept is best elucidated in Africa Betrayed.
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south. It is a club for which there is no membership standard, and it is therefore
unsurprising that the AU's default position is to avoid offending even the most
heinous warlords. Even casual observers could have guaranteed that the AU-led
peacekeeping force initially installed in Darfur would simply serve as a place-
holder as the suffering continued. The Southern African Development Com-
munity has been largely ineffective in addressing the long, steady slide in Zim-
babwe, although a number of countries in the region have bravely bucked
public sentiment and called for President Robert Mugabe to stand aside."
Despite these shortcomings, the United States still can work with regional
organizations to halt genocide and war crimes. Indeed, this is the ideal result in
normal situations. But efforts by the United States to pass the buck to regional
organizations while it stands on the sidelines are rightly interpreted by regional
governments as abdicating responsibility. Take these comments made by then-
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer in February
2006:
The United States has said that a genocide has occurred in Sudan and
we continue to be concerned about the security environment in Dar-
fur. As far as the question of U.S. troops, I think that what we need to
do is put the focus on strengthening the [African Union Mission in Su-
dan] force that's there.2 7
Frazer's words also underscore the need for the United States to support once
again the development of regional organizations as bodies reflecting a core
commitment to shared values: democracy, human rights, and free and fair
trade. The United States succeeded during the Cold War by continually expand-
ing the number of countries in Europe that shared these core values. The time
has come to replicate that formula in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Expecting
the AU to respond effectively in Darfur when its active members include des-
potic nations such as Sudan itself, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea is a pipe
dream.
F. "Let's Send Peacekeepers, but Not Our Own"
If all else fails for an American president eager to avoid dealing with geno-
cide and war crimes, there is no better place to turn than the UN. The UN can
be an endless wellspring of dilatory tactics, bureaucratic entanglements, and
opportunities to blame shortcoming on allies, enemies, and faceless functionar-
ies.
26. Jonathan Clayton, The Silent Neighbours Find Their Voice, TIMES (London), June
26, 2008, at 6.
27. jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Sec'y of State for African Affairs, & Kristen Silverberg,
Assistant Sec'y of State for Int'l Org. Affairs, Briefing on U.S. Efforts in Darfur and
U.S. Efforts To Lead the UN Security Council and Work with the African Union
and Other Nations on a Transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan to
a UN Mission (Feb. 3, 2006), http://200l-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2oo6/
6o376.htm.
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During the 199os, the United States rather painfully learned how inade-
quate UN peacekeeping missions can be. Disastrous efforts in Bosnia, Somalia,
and Rwanda compelled many people to doubt the relevance of the UN and its
ability to play a positive role in the world. For example, the first UN peacekeep-
ing mission in Bosnia, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), was an unmiti-
gated fiasco. Operations had to be cleared not only through military command-
ers but also through a cumbersome UN political process. UN peacekeepers were
taken hostage and tied to bridges by Serbian forces to prevent these structures
from being bombed.2" UNPROFOR was unsuccessful at defending itself and
even worse at defending civilians.2 9 In a similarly shameful exercise, UN peace-
keepers in Rwanda were essentially ordered to stay out of the way in 199430 as
Interahamwe (paramilitary forces) and the Hutu military killed approximately
8oo,ooo people in loo days. Militias swept into compounds to murder civilians
literally minutes after UN peacekeepers left the grounds. Equally troubling, the
international community refused to take action against the Hutu militias and
army members who conducted the genocide and fled to refugee camps in the
DRC (then Zaire). The failure to deal with the g~nocidaires not only denied jus-
tice to the families of those killed Rwandans, it also helped ensure that eastern
DRC slipped further into its own long-running cycle of killings, reprisals, and
competition for mineral wealth. Critics warned that the world was headed for
an age of anarchy filled with failing states, civil wars, and near-biblical clashes
over basic resources at a time when the UN did not seem capable of making a
difference.
II. STUMBLING TOWARD SUCCESS
For a period, generally in the latter half of the 199os and at the turn of the
century, the U.S. government seemed much more willing to make hard choices
in combating war crimes and crimes against humanity. After the dismal peace-
keeping failures of the early 199os, the international community (usually, but
not always, led by the United States) experienced a modest but important string
of successes in protecting civilians against their own marauding governments in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Liberia. These successes were
uneven and often messy, but they were much better than the alternatives and
vastly superior to the horrific status quo in these regions. A rare but important
early example was the preventive UN force deployed in Macedonia to help the
country avoid entanglement with the violence suffered elsewhere in the former
28. CAROLE HODGE, BRITAIN AND THE BALKANS 111 (2006); Roger Cohen, After 2d
Strike from NATO, Serbs Detain U.N. Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1995, at Ai.
29. See generally ADAM LEBOR, "COMPLICITY WITH EVIL": THE UNITED NATIONS IN
THE AGE OF MODERN GENOCIDE 23-54 (2006) (discussing the actions of the UN
and UNPROFOR in the Bosnian crisis).




Yugoslavia." The Macedonian example is notable as one of the genuine tri-
umphs of preventive diplomacy. The 1999 NATO-led military action against
Milogevi~s government later allowed approximately 800,000 Kosovar Albanian
refugees to return to the homes and villages from which they had been ethni-
cally cleansed. The presence of a U.S. warship off the coast of Monrovia helped
convince Liberian warlord and President Charles Taylor that he should retire
into exile, allowing the country to take rapid steps toward peace and recon-
struction.32 In East Timor, a multinational peacekeeping force led by Australia
helped restore order and a sense of normalcy to the lives of people who had la-
bored under repressive conditions for years.3  Along with these humanitarian
interventions, the basic notion that governments have a responsibility to pro-
tect their own populations gathered steam.3 4 Sovereignty, while still a corner-
stone of international law and practice, would no longer serve as an excuse for
governments' perpetrating abuses against minority populations within their
own borders. Action taken in Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor, and Sierra Leone, among
other nations, made clear that the international community was willing to back
its approach with reasoned and commensurate force if necessary.
The United States and its allies learned how to manage more effective
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and American political leaders be-
came more comfortable talking about the basic international norms worth de-
fending. A few key defining factors of successful humanitarian interventions
emerged. First, there had to be a clear leader of military operations, marshaling
a modern military power with all the assets that accompany such stature. Sec-
ond, regional institutions such as NATO and the European Union preferably
would join the effort, and a UN mandate was welcome. The absence of either,
however, would not deter like-minded nations from taking essential action to
defend civilian targets from mass violence or ethnic cleaning. Third, military
efforts needed support from robust diplomacy and efforts to strike a viable
peace deal among the warring parties. The Dayton Agreement that ended the
war in Bosnia was untidy, but the former Yugoslavia fortunately bears very little
resemblance to the dark days of the siege of Sarajevo. 35 Reconstruction was un-
derstood to be a joint endeavor requiring involvement from multilateral institu-
31. See HENRYK J. SOKALSKI, AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: MACEDONIA AND THE UN
EXPERIENCE IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 212-14 (2003).
32. See Somini Sengupta, Leader of Liberia Surrenders Power and Enters Exile, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at Ai.
33. IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR 119-31 (2001).
34. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSI-
BILITY To PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp.
35. For a discussion of some of the challenges of the Dayton agreement, see NIDA
GELAZIS, ROBERT BENJAMIN & LINDSAY LLOYD, WOODROW WILSON CTR.,
INSTITUTIONALIZED ETHNIC DIVISION IN BOSNIA: A WAY FORWARD
FOR IRAQ? (2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic-id=1422&
fuseaction=topics.item&news-id=3o9226.
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tions. A critical mass of humanitarian intervention and post-conflict redevel-
opment experts supporting these principles emerged. Further accountability for
past crimes had to be part of an enduring peace. Through special tribunals, al-
leged war criminals from Rwanda and across the Balkans found their way to
The Hague, as did Taylor from Liberia. 6 The timeline of these events helps clar-
ify important trends as well. Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Somalia,
Rwanda, and Liberia during the early 199os were widely regarded as failures, as
were initial peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone at the end of the decade. Yet,
when later peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (NATO), Kosovo (NATO), East
Timor (Australia), and Sierra Leone (the UK) had clear and strong leadership,
those operations were demonstrably more successful.
III. AND THEN CAME IRAQ
The Iraq invasion and the policies of the Bush Administration, however,
unraveled much of the momentum the international community achieved dur-
ing the previous decade. Philosophically, President Bush made clear in the 2000
campaign that he felt the United States should not intervene even in cases as ex-
treme as genocide. 7 In the early days of the Bush presidency, the Administra-
tion was eager to pull U.S. troops precipitously out of the peacekeeping opera-
tion in Bosnia-a decision that was only reversed after an outcry from NATO
allies." The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Iraq invasion fur-
ther accelerated a growing international divide in the debate on the merits of
and proper strategies for humanitarian intervention. First, despite efforts by the
Bush Administration to portray the Iraq invasion as a multilateral effort, many
commentators and diplomats viewed the invasion specifically as a unilateral ef-
fort designed to achieve regime change. Second, instead of relying on multilat-
eral institutions or international experts to help rebuild Iraq, the administration
often turned such work over to untrained political cronies with little or no ex-
36. See About the International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
About+the+Court/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); About the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009); About the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, http://169.94.1.53/default (follow the "About the Tribunal" hyperlink,
then follow the "General Information" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2009);
About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/
70/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
37. In the October 11, 2000 presidential debate, then-Governor Bush said he would
not have supported sending U.S. troops to stop the genocide in Rwanda. The Sec-
ond Bush-Gore Presidential Debate (PBS television broadcast Oct. 11, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/20oodebates/2ndebate2.html.
38. See Steve Erlanger, Europeans Say Bush's Pledge To Pull out of Balkans Could Split




perience in post-conflict settings.3 9 Third, stiff Iraqi resistance and the need for
the United States to expand its troop presence significantly as the insurgency
continued reinforced the notion that interventions can strain military forces
and generate massive expenses and chaos. Iraq is now the 800-pound gorilla in
discussions about humanitarian interventions and possible strategies in places
like Darfur. Members of both major political parties have been loath to ac-
knowledge that fact. Iraq has changed the calculus for most activists who would
normally clamor for humanitarian intervention in Darfur led by the United
States, NATO, or a robust UN force. In addition, the Iraq war has significantly
drained U.S. military resources, making it less able to lend human support to
any potential intervention. In short, the war in Iraq has impeded the promise of
humanitarian intervention by years, if not decades, both philosophically and
operationally.
Although the Bush Administration tried to portray the invasion of Iraq as a
humanitarian intervention after the search for weapons of mass destruction
proved fruitless, the invasion was always designed as a military operation to
achieve regime change. 4 The responsibility to protect had nothing to do with
the imperatives behind the invasion. But the "rebranding" of Iraq as a humani-
tarian intervention did have a powerful effect, in that it made both the Ameri-
can public and the international community extremely wary of the United
States' ability to use military force judiciously in support of human rights im-
peratives.
This new reality was probably revealed most starkly in Sudan. American ac-
tivists who normally would have been calling vociferously for some form of
military action simply did not trust the Bush Administration to carry out such
an operation without making the situation on the ground, or relations with
Arab states, even worse.41 The Pentagon felt stretched incredibly thin in Iraq
and Afghanistan and wanted no part of discussions about such operations. Al-
though Osama bin Laden once called Khartoum home, political conservatives
suggested that cooperating with Sudan on counter-terrorism issues was more
important than the plight of Darfuris who continued to be driven from their
39. For a telling description of this approach, see RAjiv CHANDRASEKARAN, IMPERIAL
LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY 83-99 (2OO6).
40. See Jonathan Tepperman, Fighting Wars of Peace, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 13,
2008, at 19, available at http://www.jonathantepperman.com/Welcome-files/
WorldView.pdf.
41. In discussions among advocacy groups, some activists were reluctant to call even
for the imposition of a no-fly zone, fearing that it might provoke the Sudanese
government to cut off aid supplies or intensify their campaigns against civilians
on the ground. Others feared that the international community might half-
heartedly enforce such a no-fly zone, thus angering the Sudanese government and
intensifying the conflict on the ground without fundamentally changing the dy-
namics of the situation in Darfur.
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homes and killed in large numbers. 4 To make matters worse, the Sudanese gov-
ernment appeared to be well aware of these divisions in the United States, and
did everything it could to exploit them.43
Consequently, the international community has reverted to one of its worst
habits from the early 199os: authorizing UN forces while recognizing that they
lack the requisite tools, resources, and military backbone. In Darfur, the DRC,
and, potentially, Somalia, the United States has played a key role in supporting
the establishment of peacekeeping missions that have no peace to keep and that
are built around militaries unwilling or unable to keep the warring parties at
bay."4 Darfur in 2009 looks eerily similar to Bosnia in 1993. Government forces
launch attacks on camps for the displaced, and UN forces spend hours trying to
negotiate their way through roadblocks. This willingness to send undermanned
forces into harm's way absent a viable peace process is shameful, incredibly cor-
rosive to the standing of the UN, and ultimately tragic for the civilians that con-
tinue to be killed despite the presence of blue helmets. Conversely, it is clear
that the United States either participates in or relies on its close allies for those
peacekeeping missions it genuinely wants to succeed.
IV. WHITHER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION?
The Obama Administration inherits a difficult international legacy. It faces
hot wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan and must contend with a military that
has been pushed to its limits. A deepening financial crisis will have the duel ef-
fects of limiting resources and encouraging Americans to take a more insular
view on potential foreign entanglements. Crises involving mass violence against
civilians in the DRC, Darfur, and Somalia are burning brightly with no quick fix
in sight. These conflicts have moved beyond the preventative stage into full-
blown and enduring crises. Equally challenging, the Obama Administration has
set a very high bar for itself with strong rhetorical support for humanitarian in-
terventions and the responsibility to protect. Supporters fully expect the White
House to deal decisively with mass violence against civilians around the globe.
For example, in 2OOl, Susan Rice told the Atlantic Monthly that, after reflecting
on her role in government during the Rwandan genocide, she "swore to
42. See KEVIN FUNK & STEVEN FAKE, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, DARFUR-
INTERVENTION AND THE USA 50-51 (2o08).
43. John Norris, Executive Director, The Enough Project, Testimony before the Con-
gressional Human Rights Caucus (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://
investorsagainstgenocide.org/20o8-0910%2oCHRC%20testimony%200f%2oJohn%
2oNorris.pdf.
44. See REBECCA FEELEY & COLIN THOMAS-JENSEN, BEYOND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN
EASTERN CONGO (20o8), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/
beyond-crisis-management-eastern-congo; John Prendergast, John Norris & Jerry
Fowler, Enough Project, A Letter to President-Elect Barack Obama: A Peace Surge





[heriself that if [she] ever faced such a crisis again, [she] would come down on
the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required." 45
Rice's sentiment is laudable, but the administration is under many, if not
more, of the same pressures that led earlier administrations down the path of
inaction. Political advisers will argue that tough action would expend too much
political capital, career staffers at the State Department and Pentagon will
sketch out nightmare scenarios of U.S. interventions gone wrong, and legisla-
tors will contend that domestic policy should trump international adventurism.
President Obama will hear every argument that led previous Secretaries of State
to make decisions they deeply regretted by the end of their tenures.
Some solutions are straightforward. The President can commit not to sup-
port peacekeeping missions if it is clear from the onset of planning that their
design is fundamentally flawed and they lack the resources and commitment to
be effective. The President can adopt many of the sensible recommendations of
the Genocide Prevention Task Force and respond to crises with a much more
preventive focus rather than waiting until they have escalated to the disastrous
point where only poor policy alternatives remain. He can also take practical
steps to expand American diplomatic presence around the globe, particularly in
Africa, where many embassies remain woefully understaffed. The President and
Secretary Clinton should also push hard to make sure that embassies are staffed
with personnel who have specific regional expertise as well as a solid under-
standing of the complexities that attend peacemaking and post-conflict recon-
struction.
In those situations where conflicts have already become intense, the Presi-
dent can take several crucial steps. Importantly, he can revive the spirit and
practice of multilateral consultation and coordination that made earlier ap-
proaches to dealing with such conflicts more effective. The administration
would be well-served by exploring the regional dimensions of the conflicts in
Africa, and, given their complexity, avoiding the trap of treating these situations
in isolation. Lastly, President Obama should assign talented and high-profile
special envoys to take on the most difficult of conflicts, a policy he has em-
braced in the Middle East and with Afghanistan-Pakistan and promised to im-
plement for Sudan. No matter how grim Somalia or Sudan may look today,
these situations are not intractable, just as the situations in Liberia and Bosnia
were not intractable.
Still, the hardest choice facing President Obama will be deeply personal.
Will he stake his reputation on an honest conversation with the American pub-
lic? Instead of explaining why we cannot act, will he passionately argue why we
must? Instead of trying to contain crimes against humanity, will he move to
stop them? In one sense, this President may be uniquely positioned to abandon
his predecessor's strategy for a very simple reason. His core constituency ex-
pects him to do so. Many of the President's ardent supporters would view his
administration's failure to act robustly in the face of genocide as a fundamental
45. Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 20o, at 84,
107-o8.
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betrayal of the ideals upon which he earlier campaigned. Since the dark days of
the early 199os, greater numbers of Americans now share the belief that the
United States should play a role in stopping mass atrocities and war crimes
when it can do so. This belief is reflected not only in the more than one million
Americans who have become involved in Darfur activism, but also in the in-
creased adherence to principles of prevention among scholars and policymak-
ers. 6 Numerous groups, including the Enough Project, are working to expand
and nurture this permanent constituency against mass atrocities and war
crimes. Will public outcries be sufficient to ensure that President Obama over-
comes the myriad bureaucratic forces in favor of inertia? The answer is difficult
to predict. But it is clear that building a public constituency for robust action
has often been the missing ingredient in the effort to combat genocide and war
crimes.
CONCLUSION
I wish the President every success in these vital endeavors, but I want to be
clear that good intentions will not suffice. I, like many others, firmly believe
that this country has a fundamental duty to combat genocide and war crimes. If
President Obama is unwilling to fulfill that charge, then he should, and will, pay
a growing political price for such intransigence.
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